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Abstract
A secret sharing scheme is a method to store information securely and reliably.
Particularly, in the threshold secret sharing scheme (due to Shamir), a secret is divided
into shares, encoded and distributed to parties, such that any large enough collection
of parties can decode the secret, and a smaller (then threshold) set of parties cannot
collude to deduce any information about the secret. While Shamir’s scheme was studied
for more than 35 years, the question of minimizing its communication bandwidth was
not considered. Specifically, assume that a user (or a collection of parties) wishes
to decode the secret by receiving information from a set of parties; the question we
study is how to minimize the total amount of communication between the user and the
parties. We prove a tight lower bound on the amount of communication necessary for
decoding, and construct secret sharing schemes achieving the bound. The key idea for
achieving optimal communication bandwidth is to let the user receive information from
more than the necessary number of parties. In contrast, the current paradigm in secret
sharing schemes is to decode from a minimum set of parties. Hence, existing secret
sharing schemes are not optimal in terms of communication bandwidth. In addition, we
consider secure distributed storage where our proposed communication e cient secret
sharing schemes improve disk access complexity during decoding.
1 Introduction
Consider the scenario that n parties wish to store a secret securely and reliably. To this
end, a dealer will distribute the secret into n shares, i.e., one share for each party, such
that 1) (reliability) a collection A of “authorized” subsets of the parties can reconstruct the
secret, and 2) (security) a collection B of “blocked” subsets of the parties cannot collude to
deduce any information about the secret. A scheme to distribute the secret into shares with
respect to access structure (A,B) is called a secret sharing scheme, initially studied in the
seminal works by Shamir [13] and Blakley [2]. Besides its application in distributed storage
of secret data, secret sharing became a fundamental cryptographic primitive and is used
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as a building block in numerous secure protocols, most notably in threshold cryptography
and secure multi-party computation [1].
We focus on secret sharing schemes for the threshold access structure, i.e., A contains
all subsets of {1, ..., n} of size at least n   r, and B contains all subsets of {1, ..., n} of
size at most z. In other words, the secret can be reconstructed in the loss of any r
parties, and any z parties cannot collude to deduce any information about the secret.
The threshold access structure is particularly important in practice, because for this case,
space and computationally e cient secret sharing schemes are known. Specifically, Shamir
[13] constructs an elegant and e cient threshold scheme using the idea of polynomial
interpolation, for the case of z = n   r   1. Shamir’s scheme is later shown to be closely
related to Reed-Solomon codes and is generalized to the case of arbitrary z [11]. Shamir’s
scheme and the generalized scheme [11] achieve optimal usage of storage space, in the
sense that fixing the size of the shares, the schemes store a secret of maximum size. The
schemes are computationally e cient as decoding the secret is equivalent to decoding Reed-
Solomon codes. An example of Shamir’s scheme is shown in Figure 1. Other generalization
and extension of Shamir’s scheme may be found in [9, 5, 15, 10]. The reader is also referred
to [1] for an up-to-date survey on secret sharing.
Party 1 Party 2 Party 3
m+ k m+ 2k m+ 3k
Figure 1: Shamir’s scheme for n = 3, r = 1, z = 1. Operations are over F7. The scheme
stores a secret of one symbol, denoted bym. k is a uniformly and independently distributed
random variable. Note that the symbol stored by any single party is independent of the
secret, and that the secret can be recovered from the symbols stored by any two parties.
In addition to space and computational e ciency, this paper introduces communication
e ciency for secret sharing schemes. Consider the scenario that a user wishes to decode the
secret by downloading information from the parties that he has access to. The question
is, what is the minimum amount of information to be communicated. It is of practical
interest to design secret sharing schemes that require communicating only a small amount
of information during decoding, because decoding will be completed in a more timely
manner and communication resource will be more e ciently utilized.
For existing secret sharing schemes, e.g., [13, 11, 9, 5, 15, 10], a common practice in
decoding is that the user will communicate with a minimum set of parties, i.e., exactly
n  r parties (even if he has access to more parties) and download the whole share stored
by these parties. We show that this paradigm is not optimal in terms of communication
e ciency, demonstrated by the following motivating examples.
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Party 1 Party 2 Party 3
m1 + k1 m1 + 2k1 m1 + 3k1
m2 + k2 m2 + 2k2 m2 + 3k2
(a) Shamir’s Scheme
Party 1 Party 2 Party 3
m1 +m2 + k1 m1 + 2m2 + 4k1 m1 + 3m2 + 2k1
m1 + 4m2 + 2k1 + 6k2 m1 + 5m2 + 4k1 + 3k2 m1 + 6m2 + k1 + 4k2
(b) Proposed Scheme
Figure 2: Two secret sharing schemes for n = 3, r = 1 and z = 1 over F7. Both schemes
store a secret of two symbols (m1, m2). In both schemes, k1 and k2 are i.i.d. uniformly
distributed random variables. The construction of scheme (b) is described later in detail
in Section 4.1, Example 1. Note that in (b), if all three parties are accessible, then the
secret (m1,m2) can be decoded by communicating only the three symbols in the first row,
denoted by b11, b12 and b13. Specifically, m1 = 3b11+4b12+ b13 and m2 = b11+4b12+2b13.
Also note that scheme (b) can correct one column erasure, i.e., m1,m2, k1 and k2 can be
decoded as long as any two parties are accessible. For example, suppose that only Party 1
and 2 are accessible and denote by b21, b22, b23 the three symbols in the second row of (b),
then m1 = 4b11 + 3b21 + b22, m2 = 3b11 + 3b12 + 6b21 + 2b22, k1 = b11 + 4b12 + 5b21 + 4b22
and k2 = 4b11 + 6b12 + b21 + 3b22.
1.1 Motivating Example
Consider Shamir’s scheme in the example of Figure 1, that stores one symbol securely and
reliably for the setting n = 3, r = 1 and z = 1. In order to decode the secret symbol, a
user needs to download two symbols from any two parties, and therefore the amount of
communication is two symbols. Now suppose the same scheme is repeated twice in order
to store a secret of two symbols, as shown in Figure 2a. Then to decode the secret, the
amount of communication is four symbols.
Di↵erent from Shamir’s scheme, we propose another linear secret sharing scheme in
Figure 2b that also stores a secret of two symbols for the same setting, using the same
amount of storage space. In order to decode the secret in this scheme, it su ces to com-
municate only the three symbols in the first row. Therefore, the amount of communication
is improved to three symbols, provided that all three parties are accessible.
We use the examples in Figure 2 to highlight several ideas to reduce communication
during decoding. Firstly, the amount of communication depends on the number of accessi-
ble parties. If there are exactly n r accessible parties, then the amount of communication
of Shamir’s scheme, 4 symbols in the example, is necessary. However, if more than n   r
parties are accessible, then a smaller amount of communication can be achieved. In fact
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we show that the necessary amount of communication decreases strictly as the number
of accessible parties increases. Secondly, in our scheme we use the idea of distributing
multiple subshares (symbols) to a party (essentially using the ideas of array codes [4, 3]).
In contrast, Shamir’s scheme only distributes one symbol to each party except for trivial
repetitions. We remark that for secret sharing schemes with general (non-threshold) ac-
cess structures, it is natural to distribute multiple symbols to each party [7, 8], because
in general di↵erent parties play di↵erent roles in the access structure and should store dif-
ferent amount of information. However, we show that for the threshold case in which all
parties play an equal role and store the same amount of information, it is still beneficial to
distribute multiple symbols to each party, for the purpose of reducing the amount of com-
munication. Thirdly, during decoding it is not always necessary to download the complete
share stored by a party. In general, a party can preprocess its share so that the user will
download a function of the share.
We also remark on an interesting analog between communication e cient secret sharing
and the well-studied subject of regenerating codes [6, 14, 12]. Consider a regenerating code
of length n that is able to corrects r > 1 erasures. If only one erasure occurs, then compared
to repairing from a minimum set of n r nodes, repairing from all the n 1 available nodes
will significantly reduce the total amount of communication that occurs during the repair.
In this sense, for both regenerating codes and communication e cient secret sharing, a
key idea is to involve more available nodes/parties than the minimum set of them during
repair/decoding, for the purpose of reducing the repair/decoding bandwidth.
1.2 Results
In Section 3, we prove a tight information-theoretic lower bound on the amount of informa-
tion to be communicated during decoding, given a set of accessible parties I ⇢ {1, ..., n}.
The bound implies that the necessary amount of communication decreases as |I| increases.
Particularly, we show that the minimum communication overhead for the case of |I| = n is
only a fraction (n r z)/(n z) of the minimum communication overhead when |I| = n r.
In Section 4, we construct secret sharing schemes using the ideas described in Section
1.1. Our construction utilizes Reed-Solomon codes and achieves the lower bound on com-
munication for all I 2 A such that |I| = n or |I| = n  r. Note that the case of |I| = n is
particularly important because it corresponds to the best case in terms of communication
e ciency, i.e., all parties are accessible. Furthermore, |I| = n is arguably the most rele-
vant case for the application of distributed storage of secret data, where the storage nodes
are usually highly available. In addition to achieving good communication e ciency, the
construction is also e cient in terms of space and computational complexity, similar to
Shamir’s scheme. Specifically, our scheme achieves optimal usage of storage space, in the
sense that fixing the size of the shares, a secret of maximum size is stored. The decod-
ing algorithm can be implemented as the decoding algorithm for Reed-Solomon codes and
therefore is computationally e cient.
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We then give an existence proof of the tightness of the lower bound on communication
in Section 5. Specifically, we design another secret sharing scheme based on random linear
codes, such that the scheme meets the security requirement deterministically, and meets the
reliability requirement with high probability as the field size grows. The scheme achieves
optimal communication e ciency, i.e., it achieves the lower bound on communication for
all I 2 A, hence proving the tightness of the lower bound. The scheme also achieves
optimal space e ciency. However, compared to the construction based on Reed-Solomon
codes, this scheme requires a larger field size and is less e cient in terms of computational
complexity.
Finally, in the application of secure storage, the lower bound on communication is
also a lower bound on the number of symbol-reads from disks during decoding. In both
of our schemes, the number of symbol-reads equals to the amount of communication.
Therefore, our schemes are very e cient in terms of disk operations, which is another
practical advantage over existing secret sharing schemes. In addition, by involving more
than the minimum number of disks for decoding, our schemes balance the load at the disks
and achieve a higher degree of parallelization.
2 Secret Sharing
Consider a secret m as a uniformly distributed random variable over some alphabet. For
the purposes of reliability and security, it is desirable to distribute the secret into n shares,
so that 1) m can be recovered from any n   r shares, and 2) any z shares do not reveal
any information about m, i.e., they are statistically independent. Such a scheme is called
a threshold secret sharing scheme, defined formally as follows. Let Q be a general Q-ary
alphabet, i.e., |Q| = Q. Denote by [n] = {1, ..., n}. For any index set I ⇢ [n] and a vector
c = (c1, ..., cn), denote by cI = (ci)i2I .
Definition 1. An (n, k, r, z)Q secret sharing scheme consists of a randomized encoding
function F that maps a secret m 2 Qk to c = (c1, ..., cn) = F (m) 2 Qn, such that
1) (Reliability) The secret m is completely determined by any n  r shares (entries) of
c. This guarantees m is recoverable in the loss of any r shares. Formally,
H(m|cI) = 0, 8I ⇢ [n], |I| = n  r. (1)
Therefore for any I ⇢ [n], |I| = n  r, there exists a decoding function D⇤I : Qn r !
Qk such that D⇤I (cI) =m.
2) (Security) Any z shares of c do not reveal any information about m. This guarantees
m is secure if any z shares are exposed to an eavesdropper. Formally,
H(m|cI) = H(m), 8I ⇢ [n], |I| = z. (2)
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The following proposition gives an upper bound on k, the size of the secret.
Proposition 1. For any (n, k, r, z)Q secret sharing scheme, it follows that
k  n  r   z (3)
Proof.
k = H(m) = H(m|c[z]) (4)
 H(m, c[n r]|c[z])
= H(m|c[n r], c[z]) +H(c[n r]|c[z]) (5)
= H(c[n r]|c[z]) (6)
= H(c{z+1,...,n r})  n  r   z,
where (4) follows from the security requirement, (5) follows from the chain rule, and (6)
follows from the reliability requirement.
If a secret sharing scheme achieves equality in (3), then the scheme is optimal in terms of
storage space usage and is said to be capacity-achieving. Capacity-achieving secret sharing
schemes for the case that z = n   r   1 are studied in the seminal work by Shamir [13],
and are later generalized to arbitrary values of n, r and z [11].
3 Lower Bound on Communication Overhead
Suppose that the n shares of the secret are stored by n parties or distributed storage nodes,
and a user wants to decode the secret. In the standard way of decoding, by Definition 1, the
user will connect to any n  r nodes and retrieves one share, i.e., one Q-ary symbol, from
each node. Therefore, by communicating n   r symbols, the user can decode a secret of
at most n  r   z symbols. It is clear that a communication overhead of z symbols occurs
during decoding. The question is, whether it is possible to reduce the communication
overhead. We answer this question a rmatively in the remaining part of the paper.
There are two key ideas for improving the communication overhead. Firstly, in many
practical scenarios and particularly in distributed storage systems, often time more than
n   r nodes are available. In this case, it is not necessary to restrict the user to connect
and communicate to only n  r nodes. Secondly, when a user connects to a storage node,
it is not necessary to communicate the complete share stored by the node. Instead, it may
su ce to communicate only a part of the share or, in general, a function of the share. In
other words, a node can preprocess its share before transmitting it to the user.
Motivated by these ideas, for any I ⇢ [n], |I|   n   r, define a class of preprocessing
functions EI,i : Q ! SI,i, where |SI,i|  |Q|, that maps ci to eI,i = EI,i(ci). Let eI =
(eI,i)i2I , and define a class of decoding functions DI :
Q
i2I SI,i ! Qk, such that DI(eI) =
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m. For a naive example, consider any I such that |I| = n   r. Then for i 2 I, we may
let SI,i = Q, let EI,i be the identity function, and let DI be the naive decoding function
D⇤I described in Definition 1. In the remaining paper, when I is clear from the context,
we will suppress it in the subscripts of SI,i, EI,i and eI,i, and denote them by Si, Ei and ei
instead. We now formally define the notion of communication overhead in decoding. Note
that all log functions in the paper are base Q.
Definition 2. For any I such that |I|   n r, define the communication overhead function
to be CO(I) =
P
i2I log |SI,i|   k. Namely, CO(I) is the amount of extra information,
measured in Q-ary symbols, that one needs to communicate in order to decode a secret of
k symbols, provided that the set of accessible shares is indexed by I.
The following result provides a lower bound on the communication overhead function.
Theorem 1. For any (n, k, r, z)Q secret sharing scheme with preprocessing functions {EI,i}i2[n],|I| n r
and decoding functions {DI}|I| n r, it follows that
CO(I)   kz|I|  z . (7)
Proof. Consider arbitrary I = {i1, ..., i|I|} such that |I|   n   r. Assume without loss of
generality that |Si1 |  |Si2 |  ...  |Si|I| |. Recall that eI = (ei1 , ..., ei|I|) is the output of
the preprocessing functions.
H(ei1 , ..., ei|I| z)
(a)
  H(ei1 , ..., ei|I| z |ei|I| z+1 , ..., ei|I|)
(b)
= H(ei1 , ..., ei|I| z |ei|I| z+1 , ..., ei|I|) +H(m|ei1 , ..., ei|I|)
(c)
= H(m, ei1 , ..., ei|I| z |ei|I| z+1 , ..., ei|I|)
  H(m|ei|I| z+1 , ..., ei|I|)
(d)
= H(m) = k, (8)
where (a) follows from conditioning reduces entropy, (b) follows from (1), (c) follows form
the chain rule, and (d) follows from (2). Therefore it follows from (8) that
|I| zY
j=1
|Sij |   qH(ei1 ,...,ei|I| z )   qk,
and so
|I| zX
j=1
log |Sij |   k. (9)
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It then follows from |Si1 |  ...  |Si|I| | that,
log |Si|I| z |  
k
|I|  z ,
and that,
log |Si|I| z+j |   log |Si|I| z |  
k
|I|  z , j = 1, ..., z. (10)
Combining (9) and (10) we have,
CO(I) =
|I|X
j=1
log |Sij |  k  
kz
|I|  z .
For capacity achieving schemes, i.e., schemes with k = n   r   z, Theorem 1 implies
that if |I| = n   r, then the communication overhead is at least z. Notice that the naive
decoding function D⇤I in Definition 1 achieves this bound on communication overhead. The
more interesting scenario is the regime that |I| > n   r. In this case, if (7) is tight, then
one can achieve a non-trivial improvement on communication overhead compared to the
naive decoder D⇤I . The remaining questions are that whether (7) is tight, and how to
design secret sharing schemes that achieve this bound. We answer these questions in the
following two sections.
4 Construction from Reed-Solomon Code
In this section we construct capacity-achieving (n, k, r, z)Q secret sharing schemes that
achieve lower bound (7) on communication overhead for all I such that |I| = n   r or
|I| = n. In other words, the proposed schemes achieve optimal communication bandwidth
both in the case that a minimal set of parties are accessible, and in the case that the
maximal set of parties are accessible. We note that Shamir’s scheme also achieves optimal
communication bandwidth when a minimal set of parties are accessible. However, Shamir’s
scheme is not optimal if more parties are accessible, because regardless of the number of
accessible parties, the secret is decoded by selecting only a minimal set of n r parties and
downloading from them. In contrast, our construction enables a more flexible decoding
algorithm that can adapt to the number of accessible parties. Specifically, in the case that
less than n parties are accessible, decoding is similar to Shamir’s scheme. In the case that
a maximal set of n parties are accessible, the decoder performs di↵erently by downloading
from all n parties in order to reduce communication. We remark that the latter case, i.e.,
all n parties are accessible, is particularly important, because by Theorem 1, it corresponds
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to the best case in terms of communication e ciency. Furthermore, it is arguably the most
relevant case for the application of distributed storage of secret data, where the storage
nodes are usually highly available. Our construction utilizes Reed-Solomon codes and can
be e ciently encoded and decoded. As we are mainly interested in constructing capacity-
achieving schemes, in the remaining part of the paper (Section 4 and 5) we always fix
k = n  r   z.
4.1 Encoding
Recall that k = n r z so that the scheme achieves capacity. Let q > n(k+r) be a prime
power, and set Q = Fk+rq . Therefore each share of the secret is a length k + r vector over
Fq. For j = 1, ..., n, denote the j-th share by cj = (c1,j , ..., ck+r,j), where ci,j 2 Fq. The
secret m is k symbols over Q and therefore can be regarded as a length-k(k + r) vector
over Fq, denoted by (m1, ...,mk(k+r)). In order to satisfy the information-theoretic security
requirement (2), the encoder generates randomness that is independent from the secret.
Let k = (k1, ..., kkz) 2 Fkzq and k0 = (k01, ..., k0rz) 2 Frzq be independently and uniformly
distributed. The encoding scheme is linear over Fq, and is described by a (nk+rz)⇥n(k+r)
encoding matrix G over Fq:
(c1,1, ..., c1,n, ..., ck+r,1, ..., ck+r,n) = (m1, ...,mk(k+r), k1, ..., kkz, k
0
1, ..., k
0
rz)G. (11)
In the following we discuss the construction of G based on a Vandermonde matrix. We
start with some notations. Let ↵1, ...,↵n(k+r) be distinct non-zero elements of Fq, and let
vij = ↵
i 1
j , i = 1, ..., nk + rz, j = 1, ..., n(k + r), then V = (vij) is a Vandermonde matrix
of the same size as G. Suppose f = (f0, ..., fd) is an arbitrary vector with entries in Fq,
we denote by f [x] the polynomial f0 + f1x+ ...+ fdxd over Fq with indeterminate x. We
construct a set of polynomials as follows:
fi[x] = x
i 1 i = 1, ..., kn, (12)
fkn+i[x] = x
i 1
knY
j=1
(x  ↵j) i = 1, ..., rz. (13)
Let fi, i = 1, ..., kn + rz be the length-(kn + rz) vectors over Fq corresponding to the
polynomials. Stack the fi’s to obtain a sqaure matrix of size (kn+ rz):
T =
0B@ f1...
fkn+rz
1CA
Finally, we complete the construction by setting
G = TV.
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Example 1. Consider the setting that n = 3, r = 1, z = 1 and k = n r z = 1. Let q = 7
and Q = F2q. Then m = (m1,m2), k = (k1) and k0 = (k01). Construct a Vandermonde
matrix over Fq as
V =
0BB@
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 4 2 2 4 1
1 1 6 1 6 6
1CCA . (14)
Construct polynomials f1[x] = 1, f2[x] = x, f3[x] = x2 and
f4[x] = (x  1)(x  2)(x  3) = 1 + 4x+ x2 + x3.
Therefore,
T =
0BB@
f1
f2
f3
f4
1CCA =
0BB@
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
1 4 1 1
1CCA ,
and the encoding matrix is given by
G = TV =
0BB@
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 4 2 2 4 1
0 0 0 6 3 4
1CCA .
This is exactly the scheme shown in Figure 2b, regarding k2 in the figure as k01.
The properties of G are discussed in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Regard G as a block matrix
G =
✓
G11 G12
G21 G22
◆
,
where G11 has size kn⇥ kn, G12 has size kn⇥ rn, G21 has size rz ⇥ kn, and G22 has size
rz ⇥ rn. Then,
(i) Any (n  r)(k + r) columns of G are linearly independent.
(ii) G11 is a Vandermonde matrix.
(iii) G21 = 0.
(iv) Any rz columns of G22 are linearly independent.
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Proof. By construction, the polynomials fi[x], i = 1, ..., kn+ rz have distinct degrees and
therefore are linearly independent. Therefore the rows of T are linearly independent and
so T is full rank. This implies that the row space of G is the same as the row space of
V . The row space of V is a linear (nk + nr, nk + rz) MDS code1 because that V is a
Vandermonde matrix. Note that nk + rz = (n  r)(k + r), and so the row space of G is a
linear (nk + nr, (n  r)(k + r)) MDS code. This proves (i).
To prove (ii), note that by (12), the first kn rows of G are exactly the first kn rows of
V . Therefore G11 is a Vandermonde matrix.
To prove (iii), note that by construction the (i, j)-th entry of G21 equals fkn+i[↵j ]. By
(13), ↵j is a root of fkn+i[x], for i = 1, ..., rz, j = 1, ..., kn. Hence G21 = 0.
Finally we prove (iv). By construction the (i, j)-th entry of G22 equals
fkn+i[↵kn+j ] = ↵
i 1
kn+j
knY
l=1
(↵kn+j   ↵l) = ↵i 1kn+jf⇤[↵kn+j ], (15)
where f⇤[x] =
Qkn
l=1(x   ↵l). Since ↵1, ...,↵(k+r)n are distinct elements, it follows that
f⇤[↵kn+j ] 6= 0, for j = 1, ..., rn. Let 1  j1 < j2 < ... < jrz  rn and consider the
submatrix formed by the j1-th,...,jrz-th columns of G22. By (15), the l-th column of the
submatrix are formed by consecutive powers of ↵kn+jl , scaled by f
⇤[↵kn+jl ]. Therefore the
determinant of the submatrix is
Qrz
l=1 f
⇤[↵kn+jl ]
Q
1u<vrz(↵kn+jv   ↵kn+ju) 6= 0. This
shows that any rz columns of G22 are linearly independent.
4.2 Decoding
We describe the decoding procedure for two cases: 1) |I| = n, i.e., all parties are accessible,
and 2) n  r  |I| < n, i.e., some but no more than r parties are inaccessible.
First consider the case that |I| = n, i.e., I = [n]. In order to decode, for this case it
su ces to read and communicate the first k symbols over Fq from each share. Formally, let
the ranges of the preprocessing functions be Si = Fkq and let the preprocessing functions
be Ei(ci) = (c1,i, ..., ck,i). Therefore e[n] = (c1,1, ..., c1,n, ..., ck,1, ..., ck,n). By Lemma 1.(ii),
G11 is invertible. Denote the inverse of G11 by G
 1
11 , then the secret can be recovered by
D[n](e[n]) = e[n]G
 1
11
(e)
= (m1, ...,mk(k+r), k1, ..., kkz),
where (e) follows from (11) and Lemma 1.(iii). The decoding process involves communi-
cating kn symbols from Fq. Recall that all log functions in the paper are base Q. The
communication overhead is
CO([n]) = n · log(qk)  k = nk
k + r
  k = kz
n  z ,
1In fact this is the Reed-Solomon code.
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which achieves the lower bound (7) and therefore is optimal.
Next consider the case that n  r  |I| < n. In this case we resort to a naive decoding
scheme as follows. Select an arbitrary subset I 0 of I of size n r. For i 2 I 0, let Si = Q and
let Ei be the identity function. For i /2 I 0, let Si be the empty set, i.e., these parties do not
participate in decoding. Hence, eI0 is a length-(n   r)(k + r) vector over Fq. By Lemma
1.(i), it follows that the corresponding (n r)(k+r) columns in G are linearly independent
and therefore the submatrix formed by these columns is invertible. The secret m can then
be recovered by multiplying eI0 with the inverse. An alternative way to decode the secret
is to notice that G is an encoding matrix of a (nk + nr, nk + rz) Reed-Solomon code over
Fq. Therefore one may employ the standard decoder of Reed-Solomon code to correct any
r(k + r) erasures of symbols over Fq. Note that for all parties that do not participate
in decoding, i.e., for all i /2 I 0, if we regard their shares as being erased, then there are
exactly r(k + r) erasures of symbols over Fq, and therefore can be corrected. Either way,
the decoding process involves communicating nk + rz symbols of Fq. The communication
overhead during decoding is
CO(I) =
nk + rz
k + r
  k = z,
which achieves the lower bound (7) if and only if |I| = n  r.
4.3 Analysis
Theorem 2. The encoding scheme constructed in Section 4.1 is a capacity-achieving
(n, k, r, z)Q secret sharing scheme. The communication overhead of the corresponding de-
coding scheme described in Section 4.2 is
CO(I) =
⇢
z |I| < n
k
n z z |I| = n
,
which is optimal for |I| = n and |I| = n  r.
Proof. We need to verify that the encoding scheme meets the reliability requirement and the
security requirement of a secret sharing scheme, formally defined in Definition 1. Explicit
decoding schemes are discussed in Section 4.2 and therefore the reliability requirement
is met. We only need to show that the encoding scheme is also secure. To this end,
we first show that H(k,k0|cI ,m) = 0, for all I such that |I| = z. In other words, the
random symbols generated by the encoder are completely determined by cI and the secret.
Denote the submatrix formed by the first k(k + r) rows of G by Gtop and the submatrix
formed by the remaining (k+ r)z rows of G by Glow. Consider any I = {i1, ..., iz}, and let
cI = (c1,i1 , ..., c1,iz , ..., ck+r,i1 , ..., ck+r,iz). It then follows from (11) that
cI = (m1, ...,mk(r+k))Gtop,I + (k1, ..., kkz, k
0
1, ..., k
0
rz)Glow,I ,
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where Gtop,I is the submatrix formed by the subset of columns in {i + j|i 2 I, j =
0, n, ..., (k + r   1)n} of Gtop, and Glow,I is the submatrix formed by the same subset
of columns of Glow. Therefore, written concisely,
(k k0)Glow,I = cI  mGtop,I . (16)
To study the rank of Glow,I , note that it is a square matrix of size (k+ r)z, and we regard
it as a block matrix
Glow,I =
✓
G011 G012
G021 G022
◆
, (17)
where G011 has size kz⇥kz, G012 has size kz⇥rz, G021 has size rz⇥kz and G022 has size rz⇥rz.
By Lemma 1.(ii), G011 is a block of a Vandermonde matrix and therefore is invertible. By
Lemma 1.(iii), G021 = 0. Denote cI  mGtop,I by (u1, ..., u(k+r)z), then the above two facts
together with (16) imply that
k = (u1, ..., ukz)G
0 1
11 (18)
Therefore k is a deterministic function of m and cI . It follows from (16) that
k0G022 = (ukz+1, ..., u(k+r)z)  kG012.
By Lemma 1.(iv), G022 is invertible and therefore
k0 =
 
(ukz+1, ..., u(k+r)z)  kG012
 
G0 122 . (19)
This shows that k0 is a deterministic function of k, cI and m, and so
H(k,k0|cI ,m) = 0. (20)
It then follows that,
H(m) H(m|cI) = I(m; cI)
= H(cI) H(cI |m)
(f)
 z  H(cI |m)
(g)
= z  H(cI |m) +H(cI |m,k,k0)
= z   I(cI ;k,k0|m)
= z  H(k,k0|m) +H(k,k0|cI ,m)
(h)
= z  H(k,k0|m)
(i)
= z  H(k,k0)
(j)
= z   z = 0, (21)
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where (f) is due to |I| = z; (g) is due to the fact that cI is a function of m, k and k0;
(h) is due to (20); (i) is due to the fact that k,k0 are independent of m; and (j) follows
from the fact that k,k0 are uniformly distributed. Therefore H(m) = H(m|cI) and the
security requirement is met. This completes the proof that the encoding scheme is a valid
secret sharing scheme. The scheme is capacity-achieving because k = n  r   z.
The statement on the communication overhead of the decoder is evident from the
discussion in Section 4.2.
Theorem 2 shows that the proposed secret sharing scheme is optimal in terms of storage
usage and is optimal in terms of best-case (i.e., |I| = n) communication overhead. Note
that the optimal communication overhead when |I| = n is only a fraction kn z = n r zn z of
the optimal communication overhead when |I| = n  r.
We conclude this section by remarking on some other important advantages and features
of the construction. Firstly, the scheme also achieves the optimal number of symbol-reads
from disks in decoding if |I| = n or |I| = n   r. To see this, notice that the lower bound
(7) on communication overhead is also a lower bound on the number of Q-ary symbols
that need to be read from disks during decoding. The number of symbol-reads in the
proposed scheme equals to the amount of communication. Therefore it achieves the lower
bound and hence is optimal. Secondly, by involving more than the minimum number of
disks for decoding, the scheme balances the load at the disks and achieves a higher degree
of parallelization. Thirdly, the encoding and decoding schemes may be implemented as
the encoding and decoding schemes for Reed-Solomon codes, and therefore are e cient
and practical. Fourthly, the preprocessing functions only rely on |I| instead of I, further
simplifying implementation. Fi↵thly, our construction is flexible in the parameters, i.e., it
works for arbitrary values of n, r and z. Finally, in the scheme all operations are performed
over the field Fq, where q > n(k + r). This requirement on the field size can be relaxed in
the following simple way. Let   be the greatest common divisor of k and r, then instead
of choosing Q to be Fk+rq , we can let Q = F
k
 +
r
 
q , m = (m1, ...,m k(k+r)
 
), k = (k1, ..., k kz
 
)
and k0 = (k01, ..., k0rz
 
). The resulting scheme is also a capacity-achieving (n, k, r, z)Q secret
sharing scheme with the same communication overhead function as the original scheme.
For this modified construction, it is su cient to choose any field size q > nk+r  .
5 Secret Sharing Schemes from Random Codes
In the previous section we constructed practical secret sharing schemes that achieve the
lower bound (7) on communication overhead for all I such that |I| = n and |I| = n r. The
remaining question is whether the lower bound is tight for all I. In this section we answer
this question a rmatively by designing a secret sharing scheme that achieves the bound for
all I. The scheme utilizes random linear codes. The scheme meets the security requirement
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(2) deterministically, and meets the reliability requirement (1) with high probability as the
field size grows to infinity.
5.1 Encoding
Again we fix k = n r z so that the scheme achieves capacity. Let q be a prime power, and
letN be the least common multiple of {n z r, , n z r+1, ..., n z}, i.e., N is the smallest
positive integer that is divisible by all elements of the set. Set Q = FN(k+r)q . Therefore
each share of the secret is a length N(k+r) vector over Fq. For j = 1, ..., n, denote the j-th
share by cj = (c1,j , ..., cN(k+r),j), where ci,j 2 Fq. The secret m consists of k symbols over
Q and is regarded as a length-Nk(k + r) vector over Fq, denoted by (m1, ...,mNk(k+r)).
The encoder generates uniformly distributed random vectors k = (k1, ..., kNkz) 2 FNkzq and
k0 = (k01, ..., k0Nrz) 2 FNrzq , independently from m. The encoding scheme is described by a
set of N(kn+ rz)⇥ n encoding matrices Gi, i = 1, ..., N(k + r) over Fq, such that
(ci,1, ..., ci,n) = (m k k
0)Gi, i = 1, ..., N(k + r). (22)
Intuitively, if the cu,v’s are arranged into a matrix (refer to Figure 2b for an example) then
Gi is the encoding matrix for the i-th row. We next describe the construction of the Gi
matrices. For i = 1, ..., Nk, let the first Nk(k + r) rows of Gi be a random matrix, let the
next Nkz rows of Gi be a Vandermonde matrix, and let the remaining Nrz rows of Gi be
zero. Formally, for i = 1, ..., Nk,
Gi =
0@ RiVi
0
1A , (23)
where Ri 2 FNk(k+r)⇥nq is a random matrix with entries i.i.d. uniformly distributed over
Fq, and Vi 2 FNkz⇥nq is a Vandermonde matrix, i.e., the (u, v)-th entry of Vi equals ↵u 1v,i .
Here ↵v,i are distinct non-zero elements of Fq, for i = 1, ..., N(k + r), and v = 1, ..., n.
For i = 1, ..., Nr, let the first Nkn + (i   1)z rows of GNk+i be a random matrix, let
the next z rows of GNk+i be a Vandermonde matrix, and let the remaining (Nr  i)z rows
of GNk+i be zero. Formally, for i = 1, ..., Nr,
GNk+i =
0@ RNk+iVNk+i
0
1A , (24)
where RNk+i 2 F(Nkn+(i 1)z)⇥nq is a random matrix with entries i.i.d. uniformly distributed
over Fq, and VNk+i 2 Fz⇥nq is a Vandermonde matrix, i.e., the (u, v)-th entry of VNk+i equals
↵u 1v,Nk+i. This completes the encoding scheme. The structure of the whole encoding matrix
(G1, ..., GN(k+r)) is illustrated in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Blockwise structure of the matrix (G1, ..., GN(k+r)). Blocks of random matrices
are labelled by R, blocks of Vandermonde matrices are labelled by V, and blocks of zero
matrices are labelled by 0.
The following result shows that the scheme meets the security requirement determinis-
tically, due to the Vandermonde matrices embedded in the Gi’s.
Theorem 3. The encoding scheme constructed in this section is secure, i.e., H(m|cI) =
H(m), for all I such that |I| = z.
Proof. Consider any I such that |I| = z. As in Theorem 2, we first show thatH(k,k0|cI ,m) =
0. Denote by Gi,I , Ri,I and Vi,I the submatrix formed by the set of columns in I of Gi, Ri
and Vi, respectively. Let
G1!Nk,I = (G1,I ... GNk,I)
R1!Nk,I = (R1,I ... RNk,I)
V1!Nk,I = (V1,I ... VNk,I).
Denote for short ci = (ci,j)j2I , then by (22), it follows that
(m k k0)G1!Nk,I = (m k k0)
0@ R1!Nk,IV1!Nk,I
0
1A
16
= (c1, ..., cNk).
Notice that V1!Nk,I is a Nkz⇥Nkz square Vandermonde matrix. Therefore it is invertible
and
k = ((c1, ..., cNk) mR1!Nk,I)V  11!Nk,I .
Hence H(k|cI ,m) = 0. Then by (22), it follows that
(m k | k01, ..., k0z| k0z+1, ..., k0Nrz)
0@ RNk+1,IVNk+1,I
0
1A = cNk+1.
Notice that VNk+1,I is a z ⇥ z square Vandermonde matrix. Therefore it is invertible and
(k01, ..., k
0
z) = (cNk+1   (m k)RNk+1,I)V  1Nk+1,I .
Hence H(k01, ..., k0z|k, cI ,m) = 0. Similarly, we can show that for i = 1, ..., Nr
H(k0(i 1)z+1, ..., k
0
iz|k01, ..., k0(i 1)z,k, cI ,m) = 0.
Therefore by the chain rule,
H(k,k0|cI ,m) = H(k|cI ,m) +
NrX
i=1
H(k0(i 1)z+1, ..., k
0
iz|k01, ..., k0(i 1)z,k, cI ,m)
= 0. (25)
Provided that (25) is true, we can then follow exactly the same argument as (21) in the
proof of Theorem 2, to show that H(m|cI) = H(m). This completes the proof.
5.2 Decoding
We describe the decoding scheme for any I such that |I|   n  r. Let
d , Nk(n  |I|)|I|  z , (26)
then note that d is an integer because |I|   z divides N and that d is the solution to the
equation (Nk+ d)|I| = Nkn+ dz. In order to decode, it su ces to read and communicate
the first Nk+ d symbols over Fq from each available share. Intuitively, by reading the first
Nk+ d symbols from each available share, we have a system of (Nk+ d)|I| equations. On
the other hand, the variables involved in these equations are m1, ...,mNk(k+r), k1, ..., kNkz
and k01, ..., k0dz, i.e., the total number of variables is Nkn + dz. Because d is the solution
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to (Nk + d)|I| = Nkn + dz, the number of equations in the system equals the number of
variables, and is uniquely solvable if the equations are linearly independent.
Formally, let Si = FNk+dq , and let Ei(ci) = (c1,i, ..., cNk+d,i). Denote for short that
ci = (ci,j)j2I , and denote the submatrix formed by the set of columns in I of Gi by Gi,I .
Then it follows from (22) that,
eI = (c1, ..., cNk+d) = (m k k
0)(G1,I , ..., GNk+d,I).
By construction (23) and (24), the last (Nr   d)z rows of the matrices G1,I , ..., GNk+d,I
are all zeros. Therefore we may delete the last (Nr   d)z rows from G1,I , ..., GNk+d,I and
denote by (G⇤1,I , ..., G
⇤
Nk+d,I) the corresponding trimmed matrix. It then follows that,
eI = (c1, ..., cNk+d) = (m k k
0
1, ..., k
0
dz)(G
⇤
1,I , ..., G
⇤
Nk+d,I).
It is now evident that if the matrix (G⇤1,I , ..., G
⇤
Nk+d,I) has full row rank, then it is right
invertible and the secret can be recovered. The following result shows that the matrix
indeed has full row rank with high probability.
Theorem 4. For any I such that |I|   n   r, (G⇤1,I , ..., G⇤Nk+d,I) has full row rank with
probability at least 1  1q 1 , over the distribution of the random matrices R1, ..., RNk+d.
Proof. Note that (G⇤1,I , ..., G
⇤
Nk+d,I) has size (Nkn+ dz)⇥ (Nk + d)|I|. By the definition
of d, it follows that Nkn+ dz = (Nk + d)|I| and therefore the matrix is square. Hence it
su ces to show the matrix has full column rank and in the following we show the columns
of the matrix are linearly independent with high probability.
The first Nkz columns of (G⇤1,I , ..., G
⇤
Nk,I) are linearly independent because by (23), the
(Nkn Nkz+1)-th row to the Nkn-th row form a Vandermonde matrix. Denote the i-th
column of (G⇤1,I , ..., G
⇤
Nk+d,I) by gi. We first study the probability that the gNkz+i is in the
linear span of all the previous columns, i.e., span[g1, ..., gNkz+i 1], for i = 1, ..., Nk(|I| z).
Consider the sum of vectors g⇤ =
PNKz+i 1
l=1  lgl. Fixing  1, ...,  i 1 to be arbitrary values
in Fq, then there is a unique tuple ( l)NKz+i 1l=i such that g⇤ agrees with gNKz+i in the
(Nkn Nkz+1)-th to Nkn-th entries. Therefore there are qi 1 di↵erent ways to linearly
combine g1, ..., gNkz+i 1, such that in the resulting sum vector, the (Nkn   Nkz + 1)-
th to Nkn-th entries are equal to the corresponding entries of gNkz+i. Because the first
Nk(n  z) entries of gNkz+i are i.i.d. uniformly distributed, it follows that
Pr{gNkz+i 2 span[g1, ..., gNkz+i 1]}  q
i 1
qNk(n z)
, i = 1, ..., Nk(|I|  z) (27)
We next study the probability that gNk|I|+i is in span[g1, ..., gNk|I|+i 1]. Consider
arbitrary Nk  j  Nk + d   1. By construction (24), gj|I|+i /2 span[g1, ..., gj|I|+i 1], for
1  i  z, due to the Vandermonde matrix VNk+j . Now consider gj|I|+i with z+1  i  |I|.
There are qj|I|+i z 1 di↵erent ways to linearly combine g1, ..., gj|I|+i 1, such that in the
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resulting sum vector, the (Nkn+ (j  Nk)z + 1)-th to (Nkn+ (j  Nk)z + z)-th entries
are equal to the corresponding entries in gj|I|+i. Note that the first Nkn + (j   Nk)z
entries of gj|I|+i are i.i.d. uniformly distributed. Therefore, for Nk  j  Nk + d  1 and
z + 1  i  |I|, it follows that
Pr{gj|I|+i 2 span[g1, ..., gj|I|+i 1]}  q
j|I|+i z 1
qNkn+(j Nk)z
. (28)
Hence, by the union bound
Pr{(G⇤1,I , ..., G⇤Nk+d,I) singular}

Nk(|I| z)X
i=1
Pr{gNkz+i l.d.2}+
Nk+d 1X
j=Nk
|I|X
i=z+1
Pr{gj|I|+i l.d.}
(k)

Nk(|I| z)X
i=1
qi 1
qNk(n z)
+
Nk+d 1X
j=Nk
|I|X
i=z+1
qj|I|+i z 1
qNkn+(j Nk)z
=
Nk(|I| n) 1X
i=Nk(z n)
qi +
Nk+d 1X
j=Nk
|I|X
i=z+1
qj|I|+i z 1
qNkn+(j Nk)z
=
Nk(|I| n) 1X
i=Nk(z n)
qi +
Nk+d 1X
j=Nk
|I| z 1X
i=0
qj(|I| z)+i+Nk(z n)
=
Nk(|I| n) 1X
i=Nk(z n)
qi + qNk(z n)
Nk+d 1X
j=Nk
|I| z 1X
i=0
qj(|I| z)+i
=
Nk(|I| n) 1X
i=Nk(z n)
qi + qNk(z n)
(Nk+d)(|I| z) 1X
i=Nk(|I| z)
qi
=
Nk(|I| n) 1X
i=Nk(z n)
qi +
(Nk+d)|I| Nkn dz 1X
i=Nk(|I| n)
qi
(l)
=
Nk(|I| n) 1X
i=Nk(z n)
qi +
 1X
i=Nk(|I| n)
qi
<
 1X
i= 1
qi =
1
q   1 , (29)
where (k) is due to (27) and (28), and (l) is due to (26). This completes the proof.
2Linearly dependent on the set of columns to the left.
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The following result summarizes the properties of scheme.
Corollary 1. The encoding scheme constructed in Section 5.1 is a capacity-achieving
(n, k, r, z)Q secret sharing scheme with high probability. Specifically, the scheme meets
the security requirement deterministically, and meets the reliability requirement with prob-
ability at least 1   2nq 1 , over the distribution of the random matrices R1, ..., RNk+d. The
communication overhead of the corresponding decoding scheme described in Section 5.2
achieves equality in the lower bound (7), for all I such that |I|   n  r.
Proof. The scheme achieves capacity because k = n   r   z. By Theorem 3, the scheme
meets the security requirement. By Theorem 4 and the union bound, the scheme meets
the reliability requirement with probability at least 1 Pri=0  ni  1q 1   1  2nq 1 .
Consider any I such that |I|   n   r. In order to decode, a number of (Nk + d)|I|
symbols over Fq are communicated. Therefore the communication overhead is
CO(I) =
(Nk + d)|I| Nk(k + r)
N(k + r)
=
Nkn+ dz  Nk(k + r)
N(k + r)
=
Nkz + dz
N(k + r)
=
z(Nk + Nk(n |I|)|I| z )
N(k + r)
=
Nk(n  z)z
(|I|  z)N(k + r) =
kz
|I|  z ,
which achieves equality in (7).
6 Conclusions
In this paper we introduce the communication e ciency of secret sharing schemes. We
prove an information-theoretic lower bound on the amount of information to be com-
municated during decoding, given a set of accessible parties I ⇢ {1, ..., n}. We prove the
tightness of the lower bound by designing secret sharing schemes from random linear codes,
such that the schemes achieve the lower bound for all I. We also construct computationally
e cient secret sharing schemes from Reed-Solomon codes that achieves the bound when
|I| = n or |I| = n   r. In the application of secure distributed storage, the proposed
communication e cient secret sharing schemes also improve disk access e ciency. There
are a number of open problems: 1) how to construct computationally e cient secret shar-
ing schemes (with small field size) that achieve the lower bound on communication for all
I? 2) how to generalize the results to other (non-threshold) access structures? and 3)
in the application of secure distributed storage, how to construct storage codes that are
communication e cient in terms of both decoding and repair?
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